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In June 1941 when Nazi Germany launched a 'pre-emptive' attack on the Soviet 
Union she declared to the world that she was, by this act, leading a European 'Crusade' 
against Bolshevism. Employing the full resources of the Nazi propaganda machine, the 
media in Germany and throughout occupied Europe proposed that the Panzer brigades 
which were sweeping to the East were the Teutonic knights of the twentieth century; 
their goal the defence of Western - and, therefore, European - civilisation. Germany, 
so it was claimed, was directing a vast operation of European policing to which all parts 
of the continent had the responsibility to contribute.1 
Few in Western Europe answered this call to arms. From the occupied 
territories between the autumn of 1941 and the summer of 1944 a total of no more than 
50,000 men volunteered themselves for active service on the Eastern front in the 
specially created Danish, Dutch, Flemish, French, Nordic and Walloon formations.2 The 
real and effective weight of support for the Wehrmacht came from elsewhere: a Spanish 
'Legion' dispatched by Franco as a way of avoiding the more substantial co-operation 
with the Axis which Hitler had sought in 1940; more than 200,000 Italians; and, most 
important, the 27 divisions and, ultimately, half a million casualties given by Antonescu's 
Romania. To these should be added the Baits, Cossacks and Vlasovites and, from the 
spring of 1944, the significant weight of the Hungarian army.3 It was in East and 
Central Europe above all, therefore, that Germany's coercive diplomacy bore most 
evident fruit, and where it is at least possible for the historian to talk of a multinational 
armed campaign against Bolshevism. 
1 P. Mernet and Y.M. Danan, 'Les thèmes de propagande après le 22 juin 1941', Revue d'Histoire de la 
Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, No. 66 (1966), pp. 48 -53. 
2 ^ 
J. Förster, '„Croisade de l'Europe contre le bolchevisme"; la participation d'unités de volontaires 
européennes à l'opération „Barberousse" en 1941', Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, No. 
118 (1980), pp.1-26. Other useful accounts and estimates of participation in the Crusade in OA. Davey, 
The origin of the Légion Francais contre le Bolchevisme', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6 (1971), 
pp. 29 -45; J. Vincx, Vlaanderen in Uniform 1940-1945, (Antwerpen, 1981); S. van der Zee, Voor Führer, 
volk en vaderland sneuvelde...de SS in Nederland, Nederland in de SS, (Den Haag, 1975). 3 See Joseph Rothschild, Return to diversity. A political history of East Central Europe since World War II, pp. 
43-4, 63-4. 
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Yet, if the scale of the contribution of manpower from the West was minimimal 
and scarcely meriting the description of a 'Crusade', it does not necessarily follow that 
a larger contribution was either desired or sought by the Nazis. None of the Western 
occupied countries could be bribed by the irredentist possibilities held out in the East. 
More, the re-establishment of substantial armies, together with their officer corps, in 
countries which had only a year before been humiliatingly and decisively defeated, held 
an unacceptable risk of creating centres of national focus and revival which continued 
occupation was designed to prevent. Nor, in any case, was it evident that the policy of 
conscription which would have had to be pursued in order to achieve a reasonable level 
of participation in the 'Crusade' was one which fitted with the relations which Germany 
had with her new satellites. Even in the Netherlands where Nazification and eventual 
incorporation in the Reich was, from the beginning, the public goal of the occupier, the 
Reichskommissar, Seyss-Inquart, recoiled from too rapid and thorough an application 
of this commission.4 Terboven in Norway was more reticent still. Elsewhere, the form 
of long-term relations with Nazi Germany was less distinct and less susceptible to 
enthusiasm for military co-operation with the Axis. Vichy France was, until 1944, an 
uncertain ally whose future - if any - in the New Europe remained ill-defined and 
disputed by the Nazi leadership; in Belgium the supreme German authority, General 
von Falkenhausen, refused before June 1944 to allow a permanent SS presence in the 
country, let alone to contemplate coercive military conscription; Denmark was the 
'Model Protectorate' whose population was to be cajoled and seduced into co-opera-
tion.5 
If it is the case, then, that the Nazis were cautious in giving too literal an 
interpretation in practice in the occupied Western territories to their call to participate 
in an anti-Bolshevik Crusade, are we to conclude that this call had no function beyond 
the rhetorical? While acknowledging the important part played by rhetoric in all Nazi 
propaganda, the present essay will propose, nonetheless, that the theme of an-
ti-Bolshevism was a central point of contact between occupier and occupied. Further, 
so far from anti-Bolshevism being incidental and peripheral, it will be argued that it 
functioned as a repressive device in Western occupied societies, and that it did so by 
promoting a view of European unity which was premised on accepting the necessity and 
4 A. Seyss-Inquart, 'Erste Bericht über die Lage und Entwicklung in den bezetzten niederländischen 
Gebieten', in International Military Tribunal, Trial, vol. XXVI, pp. 413-18. 
5 See Eberhart Jäckel, Frankreich in Hitlers Europa. Die deutsche Frankreichspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 
(Stuttgart 1966); AA. de Jonghe, 'De strijd Himmler-Reeder om de benoeming van een HSSPF te Brüssel', 
Bijdragen tot de Geschiedems van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 3 (1974) and 4 (1976); E. Thomsen, Deutsche 
Besatzungspolitik in Dänemark, 1940-1945, (Düsseldorf, 1971). 
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logic of a systemic conflict as the only basis for the defence of the West. As such, it will 
be suggested that the theme foreshadowed and helped to shape the fundamental 
divisions of the post-war world. 
Anti-Bolshevism pervaded West European politics before 1939. In this context, 
as was recently argued by Ernst Nolte, the whole period between 1917 and the end of 
the Second World War may properly be seen as a drawn-out European civil war caused 
by the eruption and spread of Bolshevism and the response which this caused.6 In 
Nolte's hands this argument was directed primarily to excuse Nazism and to justify its 
murderous policies as a 'mirror-image' of the form which Bolshevism had taken in 
Russia and, through the KPD, would have taken in Germany.7 But in a larger 
perspective the idea that there was a disguised 'civil war' of which one.side was 
occupied by Nazism (alongside Italian Fascism and other similar radical ideological 
formulations of the inter-war period) has some descriptive utility. For it points to the 
common origins of such movements as defensive reactions in some Western countries 
to a perceived Communist threat. Certainly, the growth and rise to power of Nazism 
itself cannot be understood separately either from the history of the challenge mounted 
by the German Communist Party and of that Party's relation to the new Soviet state, 
or of German relations, before and after Versailles, with the Russian state. But what 
the argument of a 'civil war' distorts is the fact that the clear polarisation engendered 
by Bolshevism and its nationally based Fascist or Nazi opponents was a function of the 
history of unintegrated states. In other parts of Western Europe the case was different: 
there the radical forces of the Left, buoyed by the success of the Russian Revolution 
as much as by the defeat of Germany, expected to make a fundamental breakthrough 
in the three years after the first World War.8 That they did not, and that a 'bourgeois 
order' was restored, complicates the history of their subsequent relation to Bolshevism. 
Firstly, because their challenge was merely diverted; secondly, because 'restoration' (to 
use Maier's word) was carried through in the ground that lay between the two forces 
of Bolshevism and its competing antithesis, Fascism. 
6 Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolshewismus, (Berlin, 1987). 
7 
See the lucid critique of Nolte's arguments by Richard J. Evans, In Hitler's Shadow. West German historians 
and the attempt to escape from the Nazi past, (London 1989). g 
Charles S. Maier, The two postwar eras and the conditions for stability in twentieth century Western 
Europe', in Maier, In Search of Stability. Explorations in Historical Political Economy, (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 
153-184. 
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The key to the defeat of the radical Left in the early 1920s was the ability of 
Western Europe to return to prosperity, accompanied by some measure of redistribution 
of wealth.9 At the heart of this achievement lay the successful insertion in the political 
mainstream of the old social-democratic Left. While this was so, the attraction of 
Bolshevism could be contained - a fact helped by the relative weakness and isolation 
of the Soviet Union at this period. So, too, the decline of the challenge posed internally 
by Bolshevism diminished the danger of the emergence, or appeal, of a radical Fascist 
opponent. Thus, the central feature of the political landscape was a common interest 
from Left and Right in maintaining a strong rejection of Communism. The ground of 
political conflict was not toward one or other of the poles represented by Communism 
or Fascism but to define the limits of change that was possible between them. 
What altered this landscape was the Depression which dominated the years of 
the 1930s. It was in this decade that there was set the pattern of the anti-Bolshevism 
which was later to form a cohesive theme during the War. Crucial to the understanding 
of this development is not simply to recognise the re-emergence to centre stage of the 
two conflicting anti-system movements, but equally to perceive the challenge which the 
Depression posed for the non-Communist Left. The economic crisis which engulfed 
Western Europe exposed, for many, a deeper crisis. For, not only the severity of the 
downturn but also the lack of any counter-cyclical measures suggested an incapacity at 
the heart of the liberal-democratic order itself. The deficiencies to which the continuing 
Depression testified, inevitably refocussed debate on the necessity of radical reforms of 
structure. In this respect the claims of reformist social-democracy to be able to manage 
capitalism began to look weak, as did the form of tripartite, corporatist arrangement in 
which it had sought to do so since the First World War. This was the more so since the 
beginning of the 1930s saw a revived challenge from the Soviet system as practised in 
Russia. The Soviet drive to rapid industrialisation - which coincided with, and was 
partly a response to, the crisis in the West - offered the largest contrast and challenge 
yet to the post-Versailles restoration. By 1933 the Soviet state seemed able to 
substantiate its claim to have realised a more viable form of economic and social 
organisation. More, it appeared as a consequence to offer the only certain defence 
against a Fascism which was also energised by the Depression. 
These claims served to finalise the division within European Socialism that had 
been created by the isolation of post-revolutionary Russia from the mainstream of 
9 
For a summary of his argument see Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilization in France, 
Germany and Italy in the decade after World War I, (Princeton, 1975), pp. 579 - 594. 
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Western development. The resurgence of a Soviet Russia transformed from back-
wardness attacked the weakest point in thé armour of Western social-democracy: namely 
its inability after four years of mounting unemployment and under-production either to 
ensure prosperity for its own supporters or to prevent the rise in influence (and in the 
case of Germany, the rise to power) of violently anti-socialist and anti-democratic 
movements; movements which were also making inroads in some of social-democracy's 
own constituency. To compound the problem, although the scale of the Soviet 
transformation was hard to deny, the nature of the state which had been created in the 
process was abhorrent. The ethos of the Plan with its forced movement and destruction 
of populations, and its model of Stakhanovite labour, engendered the response that such 
a price for overcoming the crisis was unacceptable. Moreover, the emerging lines of 
Stalin's dictatorship and, above all, the increasing appropriation of Marxism to the 
national interests of the Soviet state, drove many in the West to conclude that Socialism, 
at least in its now dominant Marxist-Leninist form, was dangerously counter-productive. 
Proof of the correctness of this fear appeared confirmed by the débâcle of German 
Socialism in the face of the Nazi challenge. 
The period of the early 1930s proved to be a watershed of the articulation of 
a new and distinct position within Western social-democracy. This formulation, while 
anti-capitalist - in the sense that capitalism was regarded as no longer able to offer any 
plausible social construct - and anti-Fascist, was equally anti-Bolshevik. Given impetus 
both by the collapse of Socialism in Germany and the parallel challenge from the 
Comintern, a new 'crisis' Socialism was argued out in much of Western Europe to the 
extent that, by the middle of the decade, it dominated the Belgian and Dutch Socialist 
Parties and had a strong voice in France.10 Its origin and cohesiveness owed most to 
the analysis of the Belgian socialist, and future leader of the Belgian Socialist Party, 
Hendrik de Man. In fact de Man had started on a path of the revision of Marx before 
the Depression. His book Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, published in 1926/7 - and, 
revealingly, translated into French under the title Au delà du Marxisme (Beyond 
Marxism) - had already argued the basis for challenging the hegemony of a 
bureaucratic Marxism over the labour movements, thereby restoring both radicalism and 
10 Peter Dodge, Beyond Marxism: the faith and works of Hendrik de Man; H. van Hulst et.al., Het roods 
vaandel volgen wij, (Den Haag, 1969); P.W. Klein (éd.), De jaren dertig: aspecten van crisis en werkloosheid, 
(Amsterdam 1979); J. Touchard, 'L'esprit des années trente', in G. Michaud (éd.), Tendances politiques dans 
la vie française depuis 1789 (Paris, 1960). 
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the 'spontaneity of the individual.11 This revision he continued in Der Kampf um die 
Arbeitsfreude (1927) and, most influentially, Die Sozialistische Idee (1933) where for 
the first time he proposed a revived social-democracy which would break through the 
impediment of its class exclusiveness and form a more broadly based movement with 
parts of the middle class.12 For those who at this period feared both the attractive pull 
of Fascism and the increasing confidence of a Soviet system which was rapidly 
developing its own state power under the argument of protecting the historic interests 
of one class, de Man became an increasingly central figure. What is more, by the middle 
of the 1930s his influence extended widely beyond the formal confines of social-demo-
cratic politics.13 
Although de Man's revision of Marx went deep, it was not in itself a 
comprehensive programme of anti-crisis action. This was provided by his analysis of the 
relation between Fascism and Communism and, in particular, of Fascism's debt to a fear 
of Communism. De Man argued that the continuing crisis in Western society was both 
the cause of, and was deepened and prolonged by, the appeal of the growing mass 
movements which claimed, uniquely, to be able to master it. On the one hand, the 
deflationary policies used in all Western societies to combat the Depression tended, as 
unemployment rose, to drive people toward Communism. Given the changes in the 
Russian state, the case became more powerful for identifying with the necessity for 
Soviet hegemony. On the other hand Fascism, too, drew strength from the same 
unemployment whose effects helped feed the fear of Red revolution - a fear not 
confined to the ranks of the middle classes but felt also by those (relatively few in 
numbers as they still were) in the working class whose jobs were at risk. As evidence 
de Man cited the drift of parts of the German labour movement into the trap of Fascist 
nationalism.14 Between these counter pulls, social-democracy had little to offer. Even 
its long-term opposition to Communism was now, as politics polarised, a weakness; 
certainly, de Man saw it as insufficient by itself to sustain a mass allegiance in the face 
of the continued crisis to which social-democracy had contributed. Fascism's strength 
11 H. de Man, Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, (Jena 1927). In the next five years translations of de Man's 
book were made into French, Dutch, Spanish, English, Swedish and Czech. 
12 For a broad analysis of these ideas see P. Dodge, Beyond Marxism, esp. pp. 91-113. 
13 The most extensive discussion of the spread of de Man's ideas and influence is to be found in the Special 
Number of the Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto. Revue européenne des sciences sociales, Vol. XII, no. 31 (1974), 
especially the articles by H. Brugmans, G. Lefranc and A. G. Slama. 
14 See de Man's speech to the Congress of the Belgian Socialist Party, Christmas 1933: Belgische 
Werkliedenpartij, 4Sste Congres. Brussel 24 en 25 December 1933. Stenografisch Verslag, (Brussels, 1934), pp. 
22-3. 
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lay not so much in its offer to counter the crisis of the old liberal parliamentary regimes 
by harnessing the forces of national revival, but more that it was engaged in building 
a new coalition to do so. This coalition, de Man noted, went across classes.15 It 
followed that the attraction of Fascism could only be counterbalanced by challenging it 
on its own ground. That meant forming an equally broadly based coalition and, in order 
to do so, defining a powerful shaping theme. In practice this amounted to a cross-class 
coalition which would create the basis of a national recovery by a judicious mix of mass 
popular mobilisation and autarkic macro-economic planning: the phenomenon, in fact, 
which under de Man's name of planisme swept Western Europe between 1934 and 
1936.16 
What is important to note about the formulation of planisme is not that it was 
simply an attempt to turn Fascism's perceived recruiting strength as the most effective 
defence against it. It is, rather, that by accepting, in the name of the nation, the central 
idea of the transcendence of class, de Man and his followers moved beyond the revision 
of Marx to a direct challenge both to the internationalism of the Socialist movement and 
to its expression, after 1934, in the popular coalitions promoted by the Soviet Union. 
This was so for the basic reason that the pursuit of a strategy by which Fascism would 
be combatted by mobilising against it a social and political consensus which competed 
for the same allegiances, had itself to occupy some of Fascism's own ground. The 
assertion that social-democracy's historic role was no longer sustainable, nor able to end 
the economic crisis without the energy of the nation gathered behind a new belief, 
conceded that internationalism had had its day. As de Man assured his Party when 
advocating the acceptance of an 'anti-crisis socialism' which depended on the nation: 'the 
Plan is nothing, the action for the Plan is everything.' Above all, the 'Plan' would be the 
expression of the national will in which all classes would learn to speak their 'mother 
tongue' rather than the universal language that came from the Eastern motherland.17 
It would be wrong to overestimate the attraction which the full philosophy of 
planisme had in practice over the socialist movements of Western Europe; especially 
at the end of the decade when concern about the coming war tended to supersede 
15 The clearest summary of the positions which led to planisme may be found in the series of thirteen more 
or less weekly articles which de Man wrote between 24 September and 6 December 1933 for the newspaper 
Le Peuple under the general title Pour un plan d'action. 
16 For a description of the planiste wave see G. Lefranc, 'Les conférences internationales des Plans', in 
Cahiers Vdfredo Pareto, No 31 (1974), pp. 189-96. 
17 48ste Congres, pp. 12-21. 
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arguments about the urgency of internal structural reform. In France its most 
distinguished promoter, Marcel Déat, was successfully marginalised from the S.F.I.O. 
and, ultimately, forced to create a néo-socialiste grouping. Under Léon Blum the French 
became the first major power to seek to halt Fascism, both internally and international-
ly, through the formation of a Popular Front government in which the Communists 
sat.18 In the Netherlands, while the SDAP - also apprehensive of the gains which 
National Socialism was making in the country - was converted to fighting the 1937 
election campaign under its own plañíste banner, the Plan van de Arbeid (Labour 
Plan), it neither gained nor lost votes in the process.19 In Belgium, de Man became 
Minister in charge of economic reconstruction in the coalition government and was 
never able to push planisme beyond uncontroversial legislation to create the outlines 
of a mixed economy.20 
Yet, the revision of Socialism which de Man and his followers started had more 
long-term consequences. Firstly, the space which planisme found in Western Socialist 
movements revealed the extent of the doctrinal and tactical crisis within a social-demo-
cracy faced with the Depression and the rise of Nazism to power. Secondly, despite the 
short-lived experiment of the Popular Front and the commitment to collective security, 
social-democracy finalised in the revisionist debate its rejection of the internationalism 
promoted by the Soviet Union - a rejection which the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 made 
absolute. Following from this, and lastly, there was created a core of hostility to the 
Soviet state itself, increasingly regarded as imperialist. Much of the impetus toward 
pacifism in the social-democratic movement during the period immediately preceding 
the outbreak of war came from this hostility. So, too, did the belief that if Europe could 
remain at peace, Germany would serve to rein in Soviet ambitions. A clear expression 
of this view may be found in the article written in November 1939 by the French 
revisionist socialist, L. Zoretti, in which he argued that 'It is no use beating Hitler if the 
Nazi regime disappears too. Any regime seems to us preferable to the revolutionary 
Stalinist regime.'21 What such a statement reveals - and similar positions might be 
cited from many within the French S.F.I.O. or the series of articles in the journal 
18 
On the battles which led to the formation of the néo-socialiste group see Marcel Déat, Mémoires politiques 
(Paris, 1989), pp. 233 - 322. 
19 
Het Plan van de Arbeid (Amsterdam, 1936). For an account of the genesis and development of the Plan 
campaign in the Netherlands: R. Abma, 'Het Plan van de arbeid en de SDAP', Bijdragen en Mededelingen 
betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 92 (1976), pp. 37- 68. 
20 Henri de Man, Cavalier Seul. 45 années de socialisme européen (Geneva, 1947), pp. 133-190. 
21 Redressement, 1 November 1939. 
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Leiding which de Man wrote on the eve of the war22 - is a paradox. The revisionism 
which had started as a response to the threat of Fascism had turned, by the time of the 
outbreak of the war which it had always sought to prevent, to identifying the greater 
danger to Europe as that of an expansionary Bolshevism. 
It was this ambiguity of focus which left social-democracy as a whole uncertain 
and defenceless when, after eight months of drôle de guerre, Germany launched her 
attack on the West. 'Anti-crisis socialism' had failed either to create the means for 
economic recovery or the coalition of forces in the nation on which reforms of structure 
might be based. The failure to prevent Nazi aggression or to prepare adequately for the 
war was, of course, one for which all groups in western societies shared the respon-
sibility. Social-democracy alone, after nearly a decade of energy spent combatting both 
Communism and Fascism, had reached an impasse. Throughout the newly occupied 
western nations, social-democracy went into retreat and disbanded itself as a force for 
the immediate future. In France, even before the Germans had arrived in the temporary 
seat of government, Bordeaux, the National Assembly had voted by an overwhelming 
majority for the end of the Third Republic. Among those who agreed to transfer full 
powers to Marshal Pétain were 90 socialists.^ 
If the defeat of 1940 left most socialists unable to define a practical or 
theoretical response, for some it provided the beginning of a new position. Men such 
as René Belin, the head of the largest trade union in France, rallied to the authoritarian 
Vichy regime as Minister of Labour, anxious to take the opportunity to put into action 
a new 'Labour Charter' which had been blocked before the war.24 In Holland many 
thousands of members of the SDAP (as well as those from other political parties) 
joined an entirely new movement - the Nederlandse Unie (Netherlands Union) -
which sought to develop new cross-class and cross-confessional forms of political and 
social co-operation in the absence of the traditional constraints posed by the existing 
parties. Before the end of the year the movement had over 800,000 members.25 Above 
22 The pacifist argument within the French Socialist Party is analysed in Marc Sadoun, Les socialistes sous 
l'occupation. Résistance et collaboration, pp. 5-33. In Belgium de Man published eleven lengthy polemics 
in the Dutch language Socialist periodical, Leiding, between January and December 1939. A twelfth article: 
Einde van een polemiek, ended the series in February 1940. 
23 Sadoun, Les socialistes, pp. 38-41. 
24 R. Belin, Du secrétariat de la CGT au gouvernement de Vichy. Mémoires, (Paris, 1978). 
For the history of the formation of the Netherlands Union: M.L. Smith, 'Neither resistance nor 
collaboration: historians and the problem of the Nederlandse Unie', History, No. 237 (1987), pp. 251-60. 
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all, in Belgium, de Man reacted to the defeat (against which he had been an active 
combattant) by issuing, on 28 June 1940, a Manifesto to activists of the Socialist Party. 
In it he declared the Party to be dead and asked its members to 'prepare to become 
the cadres of a movement of resurrection' which would achieve the social justice that 
had been impossible to attain before the defeat.26 His initiative led rapidly to the 
formation of such a new movement: the UTMI, or Union of Workers by Hand and 
Brain.27 
It must be stressed that social-democracy was not the only source of 
renovationist thinking; although its ranks provided both the greatest number and the 
most articulate of activists in the period immediately following the defeat. It would 
equally be a distortion to see these reactions to defeat as having their origin either in 
a positive welcome for Nazi occupation or as a conversion to Nazism. Certainly, the first 
reactions were based on what the protagonists saw as a realistic assessment that 
Germany was likely to be the hegemonic continental power for some time. Much more, 
the theme that ran through the manifestos and pronouncements was that of the 
liberation from the impasse of the pre-war, in which was included the incapacity off the 
parliamentary regimes to bring about conditions of social justice. As de Man put it in 
his call to new action: 'this destruction of a decrepit world, far from being a disaster is 
a deliverance'; words echoed in the Manifesto of the Nederlandse Unie which identified 
'the birth of a new task' from the necessity of the times.28 The Nazis were greeted, 
then, neither as liberators nor as ideological allies, but as facilitators of what had not 
been possible to achieve before their arrival. What needed to be defined was the point 
of contact and conduit between them. 
Before analysing the form in which that contact was articulated and, in 
particular the function which anti-Bolshevism had in this process, it is necessary broadly 
to describe the relationship between Germany and the occupied western territories in 
the period after the defeats of 1940 but before the war against the Soviet Union. The 
conquests of 1939 and 1940 had allowed the Nazis to open up the economies of 
developed Europe to their use. In so doing they partially freed themselves from the 
domestic economic constraints imposed on their regime by the need to maintain some 
26 The text of the Manifesto may be found in Henri de Man, Après coup, (Brussels, 1941), pp. 318-19. 
27 For the early history of UTMI: E. Delvo, De mens wikt..Terugblik op een msselvallig leven, (Antwerp, 
1978), p. 103ff. 
28 De Man, Après coup, p. 319. The Manifesto of the Netherlands Union: Manifest cum het Nederlandse Volk, 
24 July 1940, together with the Program, in De Unie, No. 1 (August 1940). 
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measure of internal social acquiescence. The economies of the occupied territories were, 
then, in varying degrees and forms subject to immediate plunder and longer term 
expropriation.29 It was from the stocks and productive capacity of these countries that 
the Nazis replenished the consumer goods (as well as achieving a healthy profit on the 
real costs of occupation) which were essential to maintain social peace in the Reich. 
Simultaneously this allowed for an expanded armaments programme to be put in 
motion. Western Europe, then, helped free the resources that enabled the Nazis to build 
for the campaign in the East which, precisely because it was conceived and presented 
in terms of a short war, demanded in its preparation a far greater commitment to 
production and mobilisation than could be expected of the German population alone. 
The success of Blitzkrieg had put at the disposal of the Nazi regime those means 
necesssary for the final assault on Bolshevism. It equally permitted them to continue to 
disguise the true scale of the war that they planned, a scale whose extent may be judged 
by the fact that even with the extensive looting of western Europe it was still necessary 
in late 1940 to push through the deeply unpopular measure of freezing wages and 
increasing prices within the Reich.30 
German dependence on the European economies was well established before 
she launched her attack on the Soviet Union. When Blitzkrieg failed in the face of the 
Soviet counter-attack in 1942 this did not, therefore, create a relation; it simply made 
its smooth operation more urgent. If the change to all-out war found German society 
in many repects unprepared and the regime prey to the possibility of openly expressed 
discontent at home, this served to make the contribution of the occupied territories 
more vital than ever. The logic of Nazi goals in Europe increasingly bound regime and 
population in Germany together in a need to exploit resources elsewhere. These would 
provide a cushion against the true material costs of the war and, further, as the war 
began to go wrong, ensure the basis of national security itself. 
Although the outlines of the unequal relationship were well developed before 
the Russian campaign, the process of exploitation remained largely ad hoc. It was only 
from the time when the first Blitzkrieg assault on the Soviet Union ran out of steam 
that western Europe, hitherto the object of a somewhat uncoordinated, if generally 
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effective, plunder, took on a more integrated importance to the German war effort. In 
March 1942 Fritz Sauckel was appointed as Reich General Plenipotentiary for Labour 
with the specific brief of recruiting mass drafts of manpower from the occupied areas 
- in particular from countries such as France which had remained relatively untapped 
in this respect. One month earlier Albert S peer had been named as Minister for 
Armaments charged with rationalising production, especially the under-utilised 
high-technology resources of western European industry. Contracts for war work, the 
retooling of factories geared to production of war matériel, the return, in countries such 
as Belgium and the Netherlands, to high levels of employment in the engineering and 
electrical sectors and the increased draining off of surplus labour from the dole queues 
into largely menial jobs in the Reich, all intensified in number during this period.31 The 
war became an explicitly European conflict, fought not only by a growing European 
army but, as importantly, by European workers and the productive capacity of the 
advanced part of the Continent. 
Such a level of exploitation in western Europe naturally required co-operation 
at the level of the indigenous administrations. To some extent this was readily conceded 
(though rarely volunteered) insofar as occupier and occupied shared an interest in 
maintaining high levels of employment. This was especially so in countries such as the 
Netherlands, in which unemployment had persisted right up to May 1940, or Belgium, 
where there was a long tradition of labour migration to German industry. In the second 
half of 1940 and throughout 1941 the senior civil servants put their expertise and 
authority more or less willingly behind the urgent task of restoring economic life. With 
the change in the intensity of German requirements it was not a very great step to 
increase the demand for co-operation to include accepting an ever greater volume of 
German orders, especially those involving the production of components directly useful 
in armament manufacture.32 
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What started as cooperation at the administrative level became increasingly 
forced. The appointment of Speer and Sauckel was one indication of this change of 
relationship, as it was of the greater importance which the Germans placed on 
co-ordinating exploitation. The developing reluctance of officials to consent to too dose 
an association with the German war effort had to be counteracted by threats. These 
were provided by the presence of the Nazis' collaborationist allies. National Socialist 
movements and ideologically imitative groups - small in numbers as they were - were 
freely used in the first year and a half of the occupation to stifle complaints about the 
extent of economic exploitation by the simple threat that the Germans might allow them 
to exercise real power themselves. How seriously such a threat was taken may be judged 
by the prevalence within occupied western Europe of the decision to make concessions 
in order to avoid something worse. France serves as the clearest example. There, the 
presence in Paris of a group of 'ultra' collaborationists willing to take power had a 
major influence in keeping Vichy, with its desire to retain autonomy, in line with 
German demands.33 
In fact the Nazis kept their imitators tantalisingly away from real power, relying 
on the contempt in which they were held by their countrymen to provide a sufficient 
incentive for collaborators to stay loyal. As we now know, the Nazis themselves shared 
this contempt.34 Moreover, they calculated that granting real authority to such groups 
risked disturbing the relatively favourable balance of the occupation. Yet, as the 
resources and skills of occupied Europe were more and more needed to replace those 
swallowed by the conflict in the East and, additionally, as the strain on social relations 
in the Reich caused by this haemorrhage, as well as by the effects of the Allied 
bombing, began to tell, so the Nazis could not afford to ignore and frustrate their 
obvious allies. It became essential that they should keep alive the basis of collaboration 
by providing as broad a spectrum as possible of the collaborationist groups with a role 
and a future within their own societies. 
The obvious link between the Nazis and their putative partners was an-
ti-Bolshevism. From the moment of the attack on the Soviet Union this theme became 
a key sustaining myth of the utility of contined partnership. For that part of the 
ideological spectrum in which indigenous National Socialists were to be found, the 
anti-Bolshevik crusade provided the Nazis with an instrument by which they could test 
33 
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the loyalty and commitment of their most ardent foreign supporters. Participation in this 
area of the German war effort became the most public sign, from France to 
Scandinavia, of collaboration with the Nazi cause. More cynically, the crusade served as 
a most useful means of removing figures who were potentially too charismatic or 
independently-minded to be entirely subordinate. Doriot, the leading personality of the 
French collaboration and Degrelle in Belgium were prominent examples of collaborators 
who were encouraged by the Germans in their desire to fight on the eastern front, from 
which it was hoped that they would heroically fail to return. For these people, in their 
turn, the crusade against world communism expressed the main shared point of 
reference between themselves and the Nazis and completed the history of a drift to 
Fascism that had often started in Spain or the rejection of the Popular Front. 
The conjunction of interests that was subsumed in the participation of 
collaborationists in the anti-Bolshevik crusade was intrinsically ordinary and predictable. 
Less so was the attraction that the theme held for those people who, as outlined earlier, 
had reacted to the changes of 1940 with a positive energy. Their pre-war trajectory had 
led them to reject socialist internationalism as appropriated by the Soviet state. But this 
rejection neither impEed, nor led directly to, giving aid toward the physical destruction 
of that state under Nazi auspices. Fascism had always, after all, until recently been 
regarded as an enemy equal to Bolshevism. 
Yet, despite the danger inherent in taking sides in the systemic conflict that, 
from June 1941, was waged in the East, the decision to do so came to seem increasingly 
inevitable. This was so for three reasons: the change in the scope of the war itself; the 
desire to bring to completion a new social and political construct; and the search for a 
new internationalism. The first depended on the argument that the war had moved 
beyond the realm of the compromise peace which had always seemed a possible 
outcome during the first year after the defeat. It was, therefore, no longer reasonable 
to pretend that the shape of fundamental social and political reforms created in outline 
in expectation of the end of a short-lived period of occupation, could rapidly be brought 
to fruition. But - and this provided the second reason for the attractive logic of 
anti-Bolshevism - the necessity of articulating such reforms was, to their authors, no 
less urgent than it had been in 1940. On the contrary, the momentum of the first phase 
had, inevitably, slackened insofar as the benefits of the mew Europe which would follow 
the tabula rasa of defeat had patently failed to materialise. Instead, the worsening of 
material conditions and the increasingly exploitative demands of the occupier, effectively 
put all initiatives in abeyance. The vigorous prosecution of the war against the Soviet 
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Union, they argued, alone gave the chance of a permanent European peace; such a 
peace was, equally, the precondition for economic and social reconstruction to start.35 
Lastly, and following from the above positions, the focus of anti-Bolshevism 
permitted the shape of a European-wide reconstruction to be defined. Before the war 
many, as we have seen, had come to the conclusion that the Soviet system was 
imperialist in a territorial as much as an ideological sense. For them, the defeat of 
Germany at its hands would open the way for the Bolshevisation of the Continent. Thus, 
however unattractive Fascism (and especially its Nazi variant) was, Germany 
represented, even in her current political form, the sole committed rampart against 
Communist expansion. Further, Germany alone, through her defence against Bolshevism, 
incarnated the possibility (perverted as this was at present under the Nazi regime) of 
achieving a politics between capitalism and Marxism. Above all, the defeat of 
Bolshevism was necessary if international co-operation was again to be a creative force. 
Those who before the war had been attracted by the various strands of socialist 
revisionism and had looked to define a different social construct, were increasingly 
convinced, then, that it was,Germany, through her containment of Bolshevism, which 
held the key to the realisation of their ideas. Anti-Bolshevism provided them with the 
bedrock of a belief that they and National Socialism were - although only in this one 
respect - pushing towards the same ends. More, that in the pursuit of the destruction 
of Bolshevism lay the only guarantee of a European context in which social justice might 
flourish. 
It was in exploiting this sense of a mutuality of interests that the conduit of 
anti-Bolshevism was most useful to the Nazis, serving a central function in sustaining 
their own concept of Europe. In the occupied territories of western Europe an-
ti-Bolshevism helped undermine a national unity already under strain. It did so by 
transposing patriotism so that the betrayal of the national interest was suggested as 
being its most profound defence. What the anti-Bolshevik crusade sought to create was 
the sense that not only were the German armies defending Europe, but that the 
freedom of the historic nations at its core was conditional on victory over Bolshevism.36 
As Joseph Goebbels expressed it at a later date in his speech after the defeat at 
Stalingrad: if the German people put their blood at the disposal of Europe, it was the 
duty of the constituent nations freely to give their labour and productive resources and, 
/ / 
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by so doing, redeem the sacrifice which was being made on their collective behalf.37 
The anti-Bolshevik crusade subsumed the idea of European unity itself and made it 
dependent on transcendent German interests. 
Active collaborationists were a small and - as the defeat of Germany became 
more certain - a declining minority in occupied western Europe. If anti-Bolshevism 
attracted them it was as satellites of long date in the orbit of Fascism rather than as 
converts to a new cause. Those, such as de Man and the people he had inspired in 
other countries, who were drawn into that orbit by other calculations of what the war 
might bring, also eventually sought to free themselves from the service which 
anti-Bolshevism rendered to the means of Nazi oppression. They realised, too late 
perhaps, that anti-Bolshevism in the hands of the Nazi state was no more than the 
attempt cynically to harness the destructive forces which its own ideological drive had 
called into play. Some, like de Man, went into internal exile; others joined the 
Resistance.38 This uncertain trajectory is important to note since it helps to focus 
attention away from the question of the extent to which their role in the occupation 
made them fascist by association.39 What is more certain is that they sought to 
continue under the occupation what they had started before the war. To do so in the 
conditions of apparent fluidity that pertained after the defeat of France in 1940 was both 
an overwhelming temptation and a mistake. That they sought a public role in then-
occupied societies does not in itself, however, invalidate their argument that national 
revival could only occur around a revised social-democracy. What did vitiate their case 
was the taint given to it by its contact with Nazism through the conduit of an-
ti-Bolshevism. They had believed it possible to harness their own rejection of the 
internationalist claims of the Soviet state to the very different hegemonic intentions of 
the Nazis. They had wanted to free Europe from the threat of Bolshevism and, by so 
doing, create the conditions in which Nazism would modify itself. That belief tied the 
achievement of their transformational aims to the outcome of a fundamental battle 
between two absolute competing ideologies. It was this choice which in the realities of 
the post-war world disqualified their political and social arguments from consideration. 
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The disunity of Europe after the war suggested that they were, nonetheless, still of some 
relevance. 
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A S Z O C I Á L D E M O K R Á C I A R E V Í Z I Ó J A ; N Á O Z M U S 
É S A N T I B O L S E V I Z M U S N Y U G A T - E U R Ó P Á B A N , ( 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 4 5 ) 
1941-ben a náci propaganda a Nyugat, a civilizáció védelmét szolgáló kereszteshadjáratként 
állította be a Szovjetunió megtámadását, s arról igyekezett meggyőzni a megszállt Nyugat-Európa 
lakosságát, hogy az egész kontinensnek hozzá kell járulni a sikerhez. Első pillantásra úgy tűnhet, kevés 
foganatja volt ennek a propagandának. A „kereszteshadjárathoz" csatlakozó nyugat-európai önkéntesek 
száma (kb. 50 000 fő) katonai szempontból jelentéktelen, s maguk a megszállók is óvakodtak attól, hogy 
pl. Dániában vagy Hollandiában a nyugati civilizáció fegyveres védelme ürügyén lehetőséget adjanak a 
néhány hónapja legyőzött, szétszórt hadseregek újjászervezésére. Katonai szempontból sokkal fontosabb 
volt Németország számára az a támogatás, amelyet a spanyol, olasz, román, magyar, stb. reguláris erők 
képviseltek a keleti fronton. 
Ennek ellenére sem mondhatjuk azt, hogy az antibolsevista kereszteshadjáratra való felhívásnak 
pusztán propagandisztikus-retorikus jelentősége volt. Az antibolsevizmus vált ugyanis az összekötő kapoccsá 
megszálló és megszállottak között, ekörül a tengely körül alakult ki az a minimális konszenzus és 
együttműködés, amire a németeknek nemcsak a gazdaság működtetése érdekében volt szükségük, hanem 
egy náciellenes nemzeti egység kialakulásának meggátlása céljából is. 
Az okokat kutatva a szerző kimutatja, hogy a bolsevizmus-ellenesség mélyen áthatotta a két 
világháború közötti Nyugat-Európa társadalmát. Kialakításában nemcsak a klasszikus jobboldali erők vagy 
a feltörekvő fasizmus vállalt szerepet, hanem a szociáldemokrácia is. Ennek következtében hatóköre széles 
tömegekre terjedt ki. 
A szerző véleménye szerint a szociáldemokrácia esetében különbséget kell tennünk a húszas és 
a harmincas évek antibolsevizmusa között. A húszas évek elején a szovjetellenességet elsősorban a 
forradalom közvetlen veszélyétől s a militáns baloldaltól valő félelem motiválta. A nyugat-európai 
kommunisták lába alól azonban kihúzta a talajt a háború utáni válság leküzdése, a Nyugat képessége a 
prosperitás megújítására. E folyamat közepette a szociáldemokráciának sikerült bekapcsolódni a politika 
főáramába. A Szovjetunió gazdasági gyengesége, politikai elszigeteltsége, stb. csökkentette a bolsevik 
internacionalizmustól való félelmet. Úgy tűnt, nem a fasizmus és bolsevizmus közötti választás a probléma, 
hanem a cselekvés határainak kijelölése a kettő közötti területen. 
A második világháború alatti antibolsevizmus jellemző jegyei azonban nem a húszas, hanem a 
harmincas években alakultak ki. Megértésükhöz nemcsak azt kell figyelembe vennünk, hogy a válsággal 
küzdő európai kapitalizmus számára a fasizmus és a kommunizmus mint két, a rendszerrel szemben fellépő 
mozgalom jelentkezett, hanem azt a kihívást is, amit a kezelhetetlennek tűnő válság a nem kommunista 
baloldal számára jelentett. Úgy tűnt, a történelem magát a liberális-demokratikus rendszert kérdőjelezi 
meg. A mérleg másik serpenyőjébe nemcsak az a vonzás került, amit a náci gazdaság- és szociálpolitika 
gyakorolt a munkásság tekintélyes részére, hanem a szovjet veszély új formája is. A nyugat-európai 
szociáldemokrata vezetők úgy látták, a gyorsan iparosodó Szovjetunió nemcsak gazdasági gondjait oldja 
meg, ami önmagában is kihívást jelent a nyugatnak, hanem a marxista internacionalizmust mindinkább 
azonosítja a szovjet állam érdekeivel, s ez a törekvés még a fasizmus elleni fellépésében, pl. a 
népfrontmozgalomban is tetten érhető. 
Mindez új orientációs irányok keresésére, a marxizmus további revíziójára ösztönözte a 
szociáldemokrácia teoretikusait. A belga Hendrik de Man a több osztály szövetségén nyugvó, 
„válságellenes szocializmus" nemzeti szintű megvalósításában látta a kitörés lehetőségét. Elmélete, a 
planisme rövid távon kevés eredményt hozott a nyugat-európai szociáldemokráciának, hosszabb távon 
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azonban komoly következményekkel járt. Nemcsak a szocialista doktrína és taktika válságát tette ugyanis 
-világossá, hanem véglegessé-tette a szovjet típusú internacionalizmus elutasítását, s ellenségképet rajzolt 
az imperialista törekvésű Szovjetunióról is. 
A szociáldemokrata revizió különböző változatai, így a planisme is, eredetileg az ideiglenes 
jelenségnek tekintett fasizmussal szemben akartak alternatívát nyújtani. Az új stratégia keresése közben 
- mint azt a szerző részletesen taglalja - számos belga, holland, dán, francia szociáldemokrata vezető 
nézetei közel kerültek a náci állásponthoz, bár egyikük sem vált fasisztává. 
Kísérleteik sikertelensége a háború kitörése után a pártok bénultságát, egyes vezetők, mozgalmak 
dezorientáltságát, helyenként a fasizmussal való kokettálásukat eredményezte. A szovjetellenes háború 
kirobbanása után ezeknek a teóriáknak is az antibolsevizmusa került előtérbe. A náci propaganda, 
támaszkodva a különböző forrásokból származó származó szovjetellenes nézetekre és hangulatokra, 
összeurópai ügyként tudta interpretálni a háborút Ez hatékonyan segítette az együttműködési készség 
kialakítását a megszállt országokban, pl. a gazdasági szférában. A háború második szakaszában, a 
sztálingrádi vereség után az együttműködés mindinkább kényszerré vált, amelyet a totális gazdaság 
irányítói erőszakoltak ki. 
A szociáldemokrácia vezető köreinek álláspontja azonban még a német vereségek korszakában 
is a korábbi ideológiai fenntartásokat tükrözte. Egyes vezetők ugyan csatlakoztak az ellenálláshoz, mások 
azonban visszavonultak vagy kivárásra rendezkedtek be. Mindez előre vetítette a nyugat-európai baloldal 
háború utáni megosztottságát is. 
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